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Abstract 28 Dutch politicians and 10 top-level civil servants were interviewed about the
way Dutch politicians use cost–benefit analysis (CBA). Various types of use were iden-
tified. Politicians use CBA: (1) When forming their opinion about the desirability of
transport projects; (2) As political ammunition (opportunistic use); (3) To make themselves
and their decisions look more rational (symbolic use). None of the politicians stated that
they solely base their judgment on CBAs. Politicians mention seven barriers that hamper
the use of CBA when forming their opinion: (1) The process of forming an opinion is
trivial; (2) Politicians prefer to form their opinion based on conversations rather than on
reading reports; (3) Politicians don’t trust CBA’s impartiality; (4) Politicians disagree with
normative choices made in CBA. An example of such a normative choice is that CBA
attaches an equally large weight to everybody’s utility changes. (5) Politicians think that
CBA’s explanatory power is limited; (6) Politicians receive CBAs too late; (7) When there
is plenty of money, politicians care less about a project’s social profitability. Members of
Parliament identified barriers 3 and 6 as the most important barriers. They regard pub-
lishing CBAs one or two months before a debate as the most auspicious solution for
rectifying these barriers. An interesting observation is that no barriers for the opportunistic
and symbolic use of CBA by politicians were identified. Hence, it can be concluded that it
is highly likely that when politicians receive CBAs for transport projects, they will use the
CBA in an opportunistic and symbolic way, but politicians will not necessarily use CBA
when forming their opinion.
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Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is a widely used economic appraisal method to support the
decision-making process for transport projects in most western countries (e.g. Mackie et al.
2014; Naess et al. 2014). The widespread application of CBA explains the voluminous
literature examining the method. The literature scrutinizes substantive improvements of the
CBA (e.g. Mackie and Preston 1998; Mouter et al. 2013a), amongst other things. More-
over, various studies showed that no correlation exists between political decisions and
CBA results (e.g. Eliasson and Lundberg 2012; Eliasson et al. 2015). There is relatively
little empirical research scrutinizing the way politicians—the end users of CBA—use the
information provided by CBAs when evaluating the desirability of a transport project.
Notable exceptions are Nyborg (1998) who analyzed how 16 Norwegian Members of
Parliament (MPs) use CBA and Sager and Ravlum (2005) who interviewed Norwegian
MPs in three consecutive parliamentary processes in 1995, 1997 and 2001. Nyborg (1998)
concludes that most politicians found the CBA useful as a screening device to pick projects
requiring closer political attention, but few seemed to actually use it to rank projects.
Moreover, Nyborg establishes that politicians use CBA in an opportunistic way (only when
the study supports their conclusions). Sager and Ravlum (2005) conclude that there are
strong indications that Norwegian politicians make decisions first and only look at the
CBA results afterwards. However, Sager and Ravlum (2005) argue that the institutional-
ization of CBA has symbolic value for politicians, since the search for and processing of
information may itself send out signals that will enhance the status of the political body.
Disclosing this information symbolizes the ability and legitimacy of decision makers and
the political enterprise will gain more respect from the public when politicians pretend to
make decisions in a proper way by exhibiting expertise and using generally accepted
information. Since the data analyzed by Nyborg (1998) and Sager and Ravlum (2005) were
gathered 15 to 20 years ago in one single country (Norway), it is worth examining how
politicians use CBA in further research. This study analyzes how politicians use CBA in
another context, this being the Netherlands, by interviewing 28 politicians and 10 top-level
civil servants. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: ‘‘Literature on the use
of research in policy making’’ section provides a brief discussion of literature about
knowledge utilization; ‘‘Methodology’’ section outlines the methodology; ‘‘Position of
cost-benefit analysis in the Dutch planning process’’ section provides a brief description of
CBA’s position in the Dutch planning process for infrastructure projects; ‘‘Politicians’ use
of CBA when forming their opinion’’ section presents how politicians use CBA when
forming their opinion; ‘‘Barriers hampering politicians’ use of CBA when forming their
judgments’’ section discusses barriers hampering the use of CBA by politicians when
forming their judgment; ‘‘Use of CBA as political ammunition’’ outlines how politicians
use CBA as political ammunition; ‘‘Symbolic use of CBA’’ section discusses the symbolic
use of CBA by politicians. ‘‘Solutions for enhancing the use of CBA when forming an
opinion’’ section presents and discusses the solutions suggested by politicians to enhance
their use of CBA when forming their opinion; ‘‘Discussion’’ section provides a discussion.
Literature on the use of research in policy making
The main discussion in literature about knowledge utilization is centered on four types of
knowledge use, these being: instrumental use, conceptual use, opportunistic use and
symbolic use (e.g. Beyer and Trice 1982; Amara et al. 2004). Weiss (1977) notes that at the
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end of World War II, program evaluators and university researchers were expecting that
their findings would be used instrumentally, which she defines as a direct and immediate
implementation of the recommendations emanating from a study in a demonstrable way.
Several scholars (e.g. Feldman and March 1981; Knorr 1977; Weiss 1977) note that
research is mainly used for purposes other than instrumental use. They observed that
research is used for general enlightenment, to rethink comfortable assumptions and for
changing the ways of thinking about an issue (conceptual use). Conceptual use implies that
research influences action, but in a less specific, more indirect way than instrumental use.
Results of studies can gradually change the focus of the debate and/or accelerate changes in
opinions. Moreover, the use of research as political ammunition was observed (oppor-
tunistic use) by several scholars (e.g. Albaek 1995; Lindblom 1965) and other scholars
(e.g. Knorr 1977) observed that knowledge was used to improve political reputation and to
gain or maintain power (symbolic use).
Methodology
28 politicians who participated in the decision-making process around transport projects in
the period 2003–2014 were interviewed for this study: 4 former Ministers or Undersec-
retaries of Transport or Finance (from now on: executives), 10 Members of Parliaments
(MPs), 12 former MPs and 2 Deputies of Transport of large provinces. Moreover, 10 top-
level civil servants from the Ministries of Transport and Finance were interviewed (1
secretary-general, 4 director-generals, 3 directors and 2 political assistants). The main
argument for interviewing the bureaucrats is that they witnessed how (several) executives
used CBA in their decisions.
In the interviews, respondents were asked to talk, about four topics: (1) How do
politicians use CBA? (2) To which extent do politicians use CBA in forming their opinion?
(3) What explains why politicians assign a lot of (or little) value to CBA in forming their
opinion? 4) What improvements can be introduced to affect this use in a positive way? The
interviews were transcribed and coded. The option of full anonymity was offered to
respondents, since some respondents were only willing to participate under this condition.
To safeguard full anonymity all respondents are denoted as female (her or she). To enhance
the reliability and the tractability of the observations and conclusions of this study,
respondents were asked whether they would agree to the publication of the summary of
their interview on an open-access website.1 Another academic verified the reliability of the
coding of the 10 interviews which were not published on the website and 5 randomly
selected interviews that were published on the website. This academic detected potential
interviewer bias with respect to one code, which will be discussed later on in this paper.
Although this study gives a good insight into the use of CBA by Dutch politicians in the
period of 2003–2014, the sample is not large enough to draw any firm quantitative conclu-
sions from this study like: ‘more politicians stated that they use CBA for purpose A than
purpose B, hence CBA is used more for purpose A than B’. Another reason why it is tricky to
draw such conclusions is that certain topics were discussed at length with some respondents,
while there was no time to discuss these issues with other respondents, since some interviews
were interrupted by a respondent receiving an important phone call, amongst other things,
and the duration of the interviews varied between 20 and 120 min. Hence, this study should
1 The summaries of 26 interviews with politicians and 2 interviews with a top-level civil servant are
published on the website: www.mkba-informatie.nl.
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be regarded as an inventory of: (1) The way CBA is used by Dutch politicians; (2) The
barriers which hamper politicians to weigh CBA in their desirability judgment; (3) Solutions
for enhancing the use of CBA by politicians when making their desirability judgment. Further
research should reveal whether the results hold in a more general context.
This paper investigates politicians’ use of CBA, which implies that this paper focuses
on the stage in the decision-making process for infrastructure projects in which the CBA is
disclosed to politicians. For the lion’s share of infrastructure projects the CBA is disclosed
to Parliament when the minister underpins her decision about ‘the preferred alternative’
with a CBA (see ‘‘Position of cost-benefit analysis in the Dutch planning process’’ section
for more detail). In contrast to MPs, executives can receive (a draft of) a CBA report well
in advance. Only in exceptional cases is the CBA sent to MPs at an earlier stage (e.g. the
proposal for a high-speed rail between Amsterdam and Groningen). Mouter et al. (2013b)
conclude that civil servants sometimes use CBA in an early stage of the Dutch planning
practice to assess and optimize project initiatives. However, the use of CBA by actors other
than politicians is not investigated in this study.
Position of cost–benefit analysis in the Dutch planning process
The aim of this section is providing the reader with information about CBA’s position in
the planning and decision-making process for infrastructure projects in the Netherlands,
which enables readers who are not familiar with the Dutch planning process to put the
results of this study in the right perspective.
The first phase of the Dutch planning process for spatial-infrastructure projects in which
the National Government is involved is the ‘initiative phase’. In this phase, the minister
(assisted by civil servants) discusses which challenges should be tackled with politicians
from (five) regions. Since every idea is unique and has its own ripening process, no formal
requirements are imposed on planners and politicians during the ‘initiative phase’ (Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment 2010). If both the minister and the regional
politicians agree that a challenge is of major importance, they mutually agree that a project
should proceed to the ‘exploration phase’. A project can only enter the ‘exploration phase’
when an allocation of budget from the Infrastructure Fund to the project is ‘in sight’.
In the first year of the ‘exploration phase’ a thorough problem analysis is carried out and
solutions are generated by a project team of civil servants who maintain close contact with
stakeholders and citizens. At the end of the first year of the ‘exploration phase’, three
potentially favorable alternatives are selected. Next, the effects of the three alternatives are
evaluated in a CBA and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). In the Netherlands, a
lively review culture exists for CBAs that are carried out (Mouter 2014). The extent to
which CBAs have followed the standardized Guidelines (e.g. Romijn and Renes 2013) is
verified by institutes that are part of or affiliated with the Ministry of Infrastructure and the
Environment and in some cases by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(Mouter 2014). Informed by the studies the minister selects one ‘preferred alternative’ in
consultation with the regional politicians. It is obligatory to announce this ‘preferred
alternative decision’ to the Parliament. Moreover, it is obligatory to disclose the reports
underpinning this decision to Parliament examples being the CBA and the EIA. Every year
there are two debates in which the minister has to defend her preferred alternative decisions
in Parliament (from now on: debates on the National Program for Infrastructure Projects).
There is no formal rule about the number of days/weeks/months before the debate that
research reports such as the CBA should be sent to Parliament.
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When Parliament ratifies the minister’s preferred alternative decision, budget from the
Infrastructure Fund is allocated to the project. It is also possible that Parliament selects a
different solution than the minister’s ‘preferred alternative’ or a ‘no go’ decision is made.
The (non) ratification of the minister’s preferred alternative decision can be considered as a
definitive decision about the budget allocated to the project.
It can be concluded that (the role of CBA in) the Dutch context differs from countries
such as Sweden and Norway. In these countries CBA is formally applied to rank large
numbers of investments against each other (see Eliasson and Lundberg 2012). Moreover,
Eliasson et al. (2015) explain that the Swedish Transport Administration and the Norwe-
gian Road Administration make a publically available proposal of projects that should be
included in the National Plan for infrastructure Projects. Hence, for these countries it is
possible to make a clear distinction between civil servants’ use of CBA and politicians’ use
of CBA, whereas it is difficult to identify how political decisions in the Netherlands are
influenced by civil servants. From the interviews with top-level civil servants, it can be
seen that in the Dutch context, the influence of civil servants on the political decisions
varies, depending on the minister. Some executives are very open to the ideas of civil
servants, whereas other executives primarily expect that civil servants help them with
realizing their goals.
Politicians’ use of CBA when forming their opinion
None of the politicians participating in this study argues that they base their judgment
about a project’s desirability exclusively on the CBA. However, from the interviews with
executives and top-level civil servants it can be seen that Ministers of Finance often use
CBA in an instrumental way (‘‘the CBA is negative so we should not approve this pro-
ject’’). When Executives of Transport and MPs use CBA when forming their opinion, they
use it in a conceptual way. The CBA is at best one of the factors which influences their
judgment.
In the interviews, politicians state that they use CBA when forming their opinion about:
(1) the desirability of a specific transport project; (2) selecting the best alignment of a
transport project; (3) prioritizing transport projects.
Most politicians interviewed cannot mention situations in which a CBA changed their
viewpoint about a project’s desirability from positive to negative or vice versa. Also the
civil servants had difficulty recalling such situations. Different explanations were provided
for why this was so. Firstly, politicians claim that it can happen that they have already
made a decision regarding a project before a CBA is produced. Secondly, politicians
supporting road projects state that these projects almost always have a positive CBA result,
which means that CBA only endorses their viewpoint. Thirdly, some politicians believe
that the outcome of CBAs can easily shift from positive into negative and vice versa as a
result of the inherent uncertainties in CBAs. Some of these politicians state that a CBA can
only influence their opinion when the result is severely negative. Politicians emphasize that
CBA results can gradually change the way of thinking of the political enterprise about the
desirability of a project. For example, one MP states that a negative CBA can lead to a lot
of questions, it could then lead to a decision to reconsider the political party’s viewpoint
when the questions are not answered in a satisfactory way, and in the end it could even lead
to a change of viewpoint.
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When politicians use CBA in forming their standpoint, it is most likely that the results
affect their viewpoint about the desirability of different alignments of a specific transport
project. Especially when a politician supports a project but does not have a strong pref-
erence for one of the alternatives, there is a chance that the CBA affects the desirability
judgment of the politician.
Respondents argue that CBA is rarely used to rank projects against each other. How-
ever, they mentioned an important exception. Several respondents confirmed that in 2010,
during the major budget cutbacks in the Netherlands—also known as ‘the broad recon-
siderations’—which were the result of the financial-economic crisis, some projects were
terminated, based on their negative CBA score.
Barriers hampering politicians’ use of CBA when forming their
judgments
The extent to which politicians use CBA when forming their judgment about the desir-
ability of (alignments of) transport projects differs significantly between politicians. While
some politicians do not use CBA at all when forming their opinion, others argue that CBA
is a very important factor in their judgment. Politicians mention seven barriers which can
hamper their use of CBAs.
Barrier 1: the process of forming an opinion is trivial
Since politicians are very busy people, they have to be highly selective about reading
research reports. Hence, the probability is relatively low that they consult a CBA report for
forming their judgment when they consider forming their opinion about a project a trivial
task which can occur for various reasons. One reason mentioned by respondents is that the
merits of a project clearly (do not) match the ideology of the political party. For instance,
the probability is relatively low that the opinion of a member of the Green Party is
influenced by a CBA when a transport project breaches a nature reserve, since the
politician will oppose the project regardless the CBA outcome. Another occasion in which
politicians can consider a decision task too trivial to consult a CBA when forming their
opinion is the inclusion of a project in the coalition agreement. Several politicians argue
that they do not even read the CBA report when their viewpoint regarding a project is
already established. One politician illustrates this as follows: ‘‘Why do your homework
when you already know what you think about a project or what you should think about a
project?’’
Contrastingly, when the decision on a transport project is considered to be a ‘hard case’,
the probability that politicians will consider the CBA results seems to be higher. They
argue that this, amongst other things, occurs when some of the consequences of the project
are desirable and others are undesirable from the perspective of the political party.
Barrier 2: politicians prefer to form their opinion based on conversations
rather than on reading reports
Respondents remark that a politician’s personality influences the extent to which they use
CBA results in their judgments. Some politicians like to gather information by reading
reports about a topic before they make up their mind, whereas other politicians prefer to
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obtain information about a project’s merits through conversations. Respondents make a
distinction between ‘readers’ and ‘listeners’. ‘Readers’ (some respondents also call these
politicians ‘file eaters’ or ‘technocrats’) tend to use research reports such as CBAs when
forming their opinion, but this does not imply that they simply go along with the CBA
results without any criticism. ‘Readers’ are inclined to assess the assumptions made by the
CBA analysts themselves. If they disagree with an assumption there is a chance that they
disregard the information in the CBA. ‘Listeners’ tend to decide on the desirability of the
project after having conversations about the merits of the project with other politicians,
stakeholders and experts. In these conversations they ask questions to elicit the pros and
cons of a project, amongst other things. Based on the information they gather in these
conversations, they make up their mind about the desirability of a project. One politician
who considers herself to be a ‘listener’ states that she admires the MPs who aim to read
reports such as CBAs, but at the same time she regards being a ‘reader’ as very ineffective:
‘‘As an MP you do not have the time to read CBAs and research reports for all infras-
tructure projects. If you do have the time, the question is whether you can comprehend the
methodology sufficiently and if you can comprehend it the question is whether you can
trust the impartiality of the study. Hence, it is far more effective to build a network of
experts around you who can inform you.’’ It should be noted that despite the fact that MPs
and executives who are ‘listeners’ rarely read CBA reports, their opinion can be influenced
by CBA results through conversations with people who did study the reports.
Finally, it was observed that all politicians who were trained as economists or were
employed by institutes such as the Ministry of Finance before they became an MP or
executive can be classified as ‘readers’. However, it should be noted that several non-
economists considered themselves to be ‘readers’ as well. For instance, one MP explained
that the mere reason why she read an extensive amount of reports to prepare herself for the
debate on the National Program for Infrastructure Projects was that she wasn’t an excellent
debater. She noticed that the result of being a ‘reader’ was that colleagues perceived her as
‘a person who always knows what she is talking about’, which enhanced her political
influence.
Barrier 3: politicians don’t trust CBA’s impartiality
Politicians who express that they assign an important value to CBA when evaluating the
desirability of a transport project, frequently also state that they feel that CBAs are carried
out in an impartial way. On the other hand, politicians who state that they do not assign
much value to CBA results are often the same politicians who argue that they distrust
CBA’s impartiality. In the interviews, three levels of distrust are identified. Firstly, there is
a group of politicians who are convinced that CBAs are deliberately manipulated. One
politician illustrates this as follows: ‘‘I am convinced that under the responsibility of the
minister, or possibly ordered by the minister, CBA analysts have been dictated to provide
(un)favorable outcomes for a project the minister (did not) pursue(d)’’.
A second group of politicians has more trust in CBA’s impartiality. However, these
politicians believe that CBA analysts implicitly make political choices while carrying out a
CBA which influences (the communication of) the results. Some examples the politicians
mention are the following types of ‘implicit influencing’:
• The institution who orders the CBA (in most cases the ministry) is also responsible for
delivering the information which is used in CBAs. If this institution has a preference
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for a particular (alignment of a) transport project, it is highly probable that the delivered
information is positive about the project;
• All CBAs for large transport projects are supervised by a steering group in which civil
servants from the institution that commissions the CBA participate. Important
assumptions are made in interplay between CBA analysts and the steering group.
The steering group can influence assumptions and thus the outcomes of a CBA.
The third group of politicians distrusts CBA’s impartiality a little. However, these
politicians argue that despite their high level of trust, they verify the plausibility of the
assumptions made in CBAs themselves or ask confidants to verify the CBA for them.
Although it is not the purpose of this study to draw any quantitative conclusions, it is
interesting to observe that the second group of politicians is rather large compared to the
first and third group. Relatively, a large number of politicians believe that CBAs are
implicitly influenced. Moreover, it is striking that four out of five politicians who had
experience with CBA or similar quantitative methods as an academic or a consultant before
they became MP or (national) executive can be classified in this second category of
politicians. These ‘former researchers’ stated that, as a result of their experiences with
CBA and affiliated quantitative methods, they assign relatively little value to CBA out-
comes in their political life, since in their experience they found that assumptions are
implicitly influenced by the political beliefs of the analyst and/or the political interest of
the commissioner of the study. One ‘former researcher’ found that particularly the effect
estimations, which are the foundation of a CBA (e.g. hours of travel time saved) can be
influenced by ‘shifting the buttons in the model’. The respondent illustrates this with an
example from her own experience in which she had to assess the effects of an infrastructure
project. The first model run produced implausibly low values. Subsequently, the analysts
adjusted some assumptions and provided new model estimations. The second model run
produced unrealistically high values. The outcomes were discussed with a group of civil
servants and some decisions were taken. The respondent felt that this group’s decisions
were affected by the travel experiences of the individuals: ‘‘an analyst who travels by train
makes a different choice than a car driver who detests public transport’’. This politician
thinks it is a problem that citizens and stakeholders expect that a politician will follow the
outcomes of a study which is based on arbitrary—and politically loaded—choices made far
out of a politicians’ sight.
It is interesting to note that although politicians disagree on the extent to which CBA
results are manipulated, there is wide consensus among politicians that the tone and the
selection of the conclusions of the CBA are influenced by civil servants operating under the
responsibility of the minister. Favorable conclusions are highlighted in the executive
summary, whereas controversial assumptions and unfavorable conclusions are concealed
somewhere in the report. According to the politicians, it is especially the steering group
supervising the CBA that reflects on the way conclusions are highlighted and phrased in
the report.
Barrier 4: politicians disagree with normative choices made in CBA
Some politicians argued that they assign a lower value to CBAs when making a judgment
because they do not endorse the fundamental principles of CBA methodology. Some of
these politicians note that as a result of the discrepancy between the premises of CBA and
their belief system projects which coincide with their own belief system score relatively
poorly in CBAs. One politician argues that using CBA when assessing transport projects
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implies that one steps into a neo-liberal frame in which one is only busy with questions
like: ‘can we cut costs?’ and ‘can we make more profit than we do now?’ In contrast, her
political view is that the Government should strive to preserve a living standard when
citizens already derive well-being from their current living standard. To illustrate, she
believes that the coherent Dutch rail network is valuable from a societal perspective
because people not possessing a car can easily travel from A to B. This should be an
incentive for preserving the network in its current state even when some of the elements are
not profitable from a consumer perspective.
Several politicians disagree with the normative choice made in CBA that an equally
large weight is attached to everybody’s utility changes. These politicians argue that as a
result of this choice, in general, transport projects in the urbanized Randstad perform better
in CBAs than projects in the rural areas of the Netherlands, since more people benefit from
transport projects in the Randstad. According to the politicians, following CBA results
would lead to a great number of investments in infrastructure projects in the Randstad and
only a marginal number in the rural areas. One politician notes that it is the other way
around for hazardous facilities. If one makes CBAs for power plants and CO2 repositories,
the result will be that all hazardous facilities are shifted to the rural areas because they can
do harm to more people in the urbanized Randstad. Several politicians think that for
reasons of distributional equity, infrastructure projects—and other positive Government
policies—should also be implemented in the rural areas albeit low CBA scores: ‘‘tax
payers do not only live in the Randstad, but also in the rural areas. Hence, people in the
rural areas should also receive some beneficial projects in return for their taxes’’.
Barrier 5: politicians think that the explanatory power of CBA is limited
Politicians mention the limited explanatory power of CBAs as a reason why they assign
relatively little value to CBAs. Some politicians are of the view that effects of transport
infrastructure projects are difficult to predict, since it is hard to predict how human beings
and companies respond to a transport project (especially in the longer run). Politicians
argue that the explanatory power is especially limited for projects pursuing (uncertain)
long term strategic effects, like catalyzing economic development in a specific area. To
illustrate their argument, they mentioned examples of projects which brought prosperity to
the Netherlands even though this positive effect could not be assured beforehand. The
essence of the politicians’ argument is that the investment strategy of a country will be too
conservative to compete with other European countries should one systematically follow
CBAs. The politicians argue that when one aspires to beat the competition one should
invest in conservative projects but also in ‘high risk high pay off’ projects, despite poor
CBA scores.
There are also politicians who believe that it is more cost-effective to spread invest-
ments all over the country and safeguard that people have a reason to stay in the rural areas.
These politicians believe that following CBAs that disregard ‘second-order effects’, and
thus have a limited explanatory power, in decision-making is a risky strategy. Their line of
reasoning is as follows: when one follows CBA results, the consequence will be that one
invests heavily in the Randstad and marginally in the rural areas; as a result, the attrac-
tiveness of the Randstad enhances compared to the rural areas, which leads to reallocation
of people, amenities, economic activities and traffic from the rural areas to the Randstad;
this will lead to more congestion in the Randstad and a need for more (expensive)
infrastructure projects. According to the politicians, this process will repeat itself and is a
very costly strategy. One politician articulates this as follows: ‘the consequence of
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following CBA results is that congestion problems in the Randstad will only magnify and
livability in the rural areas will decrease, which is not very CBA-proof in my opinion’.
Hence, these politicians think that investing intensively in the Randstad as a result of CBAs
pointing in this direction, is not only unfair (see barrier 4) but also inefficient.
Barrier 6: politicians receive the CBA too late
MPs in particular state that it is difficult or even impossible to use CBA results when
forming their opinion about the desirability of a transport project, when they receive the
CBA only very close to the debate in which decisions are made regarding the transport
project.2 When they receive the CBA long before the debate on the National Program for
Infrastructure Projects, it is more likely that they will use this information when deter-
mining their viewpoint. MPs mention two reasons why a CBA which is published very
close to a debate will have at best a marginal impact on their viewpoint.
Firstly, politicians state that they need time to verify the CBA’s quality and impartiality.
Politicians prefer minimizing the probability that they determine their viewpoint based on
incorrect or colored information. MPs argue that they employ different verification
strategies before they decide to assign weight to a CBA when forming their viewpoint. The
majority of politicians asks confidants in their personal network to do a verification. One
respondent claims that she assesses the credibility of CBAs through monitoring the public
debate around a CBA in the media. Several politicians state that they prefer to ask sub-
stantive questions to the CBA analysts—directly or via the minister—to assess the merits
of the CBA.
A second argument which is brought forward by politicians to underpin that it is
unlikely that they assign weight to CBAs when they receive the study a few days before the
debate, is that they have to coordinate their viewpoints with members of their political
party and sometimes also with other politicians. Although MPs emphasize that the process
of forming opinions regarding transport projects is a continuous process, this process
accelerates prior to the debate in which the National Program for Infrastructure Projects is
discussed. It is not really clear at which point in time the MP’s preferences, which will be
articulated in the debate, are set in stone. However, a politician from a large party states
that 5 weeks before the debate, the MPs of her party who are part of the ‘infrastructure
committee’ already try to reach a consensus and make a proposal which will be discussed
within their political party 3 weeks prior to the debate. This proposal also includes deals
with other political parties (‘‘if you vote for our project we will vote for your project’’).
After the consultation within the political party, the preferences, which will be articulated
in the debate on the National Program for Infrastructure Projects, are ratified. Hence, in
theory it is possible that the preferences of the political party are reconsidered when a CBA
is published within 3 weeks before the debate. However, in practice, the probability that
preferences will be reconsidered after the preferences are ratified in the political party is
negligible. Hence, a CBA can have more impact on MP’s viewpoints when the study is
published before politicians start to form their definite viewpoints. In the Dutch practice, it
happens regularly that CBAs are published very close to the debate. For instance, for the
2 Several respondents mentioned this spontaneously. However, the second coder observed that it is highly
probable that some of the respondents only mentioned this barrier because the interviewer asked about it
(‘‘interviewer bias’’). For instance, the interviewer asked: ‘when a CBA is published 1 week- or less-before
the debate, can this study affect your viewpoint?’ Respondents then stated that CBA cannot have any
influence one week before the debate, but in some interviews there were indications that the politicians
would not have used a CBA even when the CBA was disclosed two months before a debate.
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two major infrastructure projects which were decided upon in 2014 (Ruit Eindhoven, 700
million euros and Ring Utrecht, 1 billion euros) the CBAs were published one working day
and three working days, respectively, before the debate.
Barrier 7: politicians care less about the social profitability of a project
when there is enough money
It is noteworthy that politicians who served as MP or national Executive of Transport
during or after the budget cutbacks, which were the result of the financial-economic crisis
(period 2010–2014), seemed to make more use of CBA results than their counterparts who
served before the crisis (especially the 2003–2007 period). Moreover, four top-level civil
servants who worked close to Ministers of Transport in the period 2003–2014 endorsed this
observation. One of these civil servants started her interview spontaneously with a remark
that CBA plays a larger role when budgets are under pressure because it is necessary to
make sharp choices. According to this civil servant there is more room to ‘play a little bit
with the money’ when there is enough money.
Discussion of the seven barriers
To give the reader an indication of which barriers politicians consider to be most impor-
tant, it is useful to remark that MPs identify barriers 3 and 6 in particular as decisive
barriers. When MPs don’t trust CBA’s impartiality and/or when they receive the CBA too
late, the probability that they will use CBA results in their judgment is negligible. Con-
trastingly, barriers 3 and 6 were not mentioned as key barriers hampering the use of CBA
by executives. One civil servant states that the timing of the CBA does not seem to be a
barrier for the use of CBA by executives, since they can receive (a draft of) a CBA report
(verified by their civil servants) well in advance. Barriers 2, 4, 5 and 7 were all mentioned
as ‘very important’ by one or more interviewed national executives or civil servants
reflecting on the use of CBA by their superior(s).
Use of CBA as political ammunition
Many politicians argued that it was more likely that they use CBA as ammunition in
discussions with other politicians than as an input for their desirability judgment of
transport projects. This section first discusses politicians’ use of CBA in political debates
and subsequently, how they use CBA in political bargaining processes behind the scenes.
The use of CBA in political debates
Many politicians argue that they use CBA in an opportunistic way in political debates.
When the CBA does not support their opinion they will criticize the study and they
emphasize the importance of CBA when the results support their opinion, even when they
did not used CBA in forming their opinion at all. The late publication of the CBA and the
lack of trust in its impartiality are not considered to be barriers for using CBA as political
ammunition. Executives use CBAs for rationalizing decisions and to ‘kill’ the political
debate. In these occasions, the executive reasons as follows: (1) All effects raised by the
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political opposition are analyzed in the CBA; (2) The CBA is positive (negative) about the
project; (3) Hence, we approve (reject) this project.
Several respondents state that the CBA is used as political ammunition in almost every
debate about road projects, since road projects are almost always politicized. In general,
right-wing parties support road projects and use CBA as political ammunition when the
result is positive. Left-wing parties generally oppose road projects and therefore use a
negative CBA as political ammunition. According to respondents, debates about rail
projects are relatively non-politicized. As a consequence, very often a negative CBA is not
used as ammunition in a political debate about a rail project because both right-wing and
left-wing parties support the project.
Executives explain that a negative CBA for a project they have to defend in Parliament
implies that preparing their argumentation requires more effort. One executive notes that
the result of a negative CBA is that you have to come up with other arguments to underpin
why you want a certain project. Two executives argued that they coordinated their argu-
mentation with the argumentation of the MPs representing the political coalition when the
CBA of a project they wanted to approve was negative, since they anticipated that the
political opposition would heavily attack the approval of the project during the debate.
Although there are some politicians who argue that executives have to put more effort into
defending a project with a negative CBA, there are also respondents who experience that
CBA makes life easier for executives. According to these respondents, executives can use
CBA as a single argument when the study supports their opinion and executives can use
some standard arguments to defend the approval of a project despite a negative CBA (e.g.
‘‘if we had used CBA in the past, we would never have built projects which brought
prosperity to the Netherlands such as The New Waterway and the Erasmus Bridge’’,
‘‘politicians uncritically following CBAs care about numbers, but I care about people’’, etc.
etc.).
The use of CBA in bargaining processes behind the scenes
Politicians and civil servants argued that CBA is also used in bargaining processes behind
the scenes. A positive CBA strengthens the position of advocates of a project in bargaining
processes and the position of a project’s antagonists is strengthened by a negative CBA.
This section discusses five bargaining settings in which CBA is used.
Firstly, the Minister of Finance uses a negative CBA to kill a project proposed by the
Minister of Transport and vice versa: the Minister of Transport uses a positive CBA to
convince the Minister of Finance. Note that in the Netherlands the Minister of Finance is
not involved in the decision-making process for all infrastructure projects. The Minister is
primarily involved in projects which are decided upon at Cabinet level (e.g. all projects
costing more than 500 million euro and other politically controversial projects). One
former Minister of Finance interviewed for this study states that she aimed to kill all large
infrastructure projects with a negative CBA. Moreover, this former minister recalled that in
her term no projects with a negative CBA which were discussed in the Cabinet were
approved.
Secondly, the Minister of Transport and regional politicians use the CBA to convince
each other. In the Netherlands, the Minister of Transport has two meetings each year with
regional politicians in which they discuss the mutual ambitions of a region. The minister
regularly uses a negative CBA as an argument for not funding a project in the region during
these negotiations. It is interesting to note that several respondents stated that a benefit-cost
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ratio (BCR) of 0.53 is the threshold for rail projects. According to the respondents, the
rationale is that rail projects rarely have a BCR higher than 1 and using a threshold of
BCR[ 1 would imply that no rail projects will be built which is regarded as undesirable.
A low BCR can also be used by a minister as an argument for ordering the region to
optimize the project in terms of societal costs and benefits. Moreover, regional politicians
use positive CBAs to persuade the minister to invest in a project in their region.
Thirdly, the Minister of Transport and MPs use the CBA to convince each other. When
the Minister is trying to gain a majority vote in Parliament for a project, a positive CBA
can be an appealing argument.
Fourthly, the MPs who are spokesmen for infrastructure use a positive CBA to convince
MPs from their own party to allow them to support this project during a debate. Also MPs
use a positive CBA as an argument for convincing MPs from other parties.
Fifthly, MPs in particular use the CBA results for verifying the claims of stakeholders.
One politician states that she uses CBA to verify the correctness of arguments brought
forward by lobbyists. This politician experiences that some ‘lobby projects’ will stay on the
political agenda until they are built. According to this politician, a negative CBA can
provide her with arguments to prevent or delay such projects.
Symbolic use of CBA
Politicians also argue that they use CBA for symbolic purposes. One politician states that
Dutch citizens like technocratic politicians, which was an incentive for her to emphasize
that she favored decisions in line with CBAs.
From the interviews with civil servants it can be seen that one executive uses CBA as a
means for depoliticizing the political debate. A civil servant explains that one of her tasks
was generating a set of rational arguments supporting the—in her words—‘irrational
wishes of the executive’. The CBA was one of the arguments included in this ‘set of
rational arguments’. The civil servant explains that politicians generally have an a priori
positive or negative attitude towards certain projects. The challenge is to produce a set of
rational arguments which supports all of the executive’s preferred decisions in a consistent
way which makes it difficult for the political opposition to challenge the consistency of the
executive’s decisions during a debate. The civil servant argues that inconsistencies in
argumentation can force an executive into revealing her real (irrational) argument for (not)
supporting a project, which is an unwelcome situation since, in general, rational arguments
are more convincing than emotional arguments.
A third type of symbolic use of CBA identified in this study is that, through carrying out
CBAs, the government can signal that they seriously intend to pursue stated goals and
indicate to the population affected by a transport project that their problems and concerns
are taken seriously. Three respondents (two politicians and one civil servant) state that if
the government wanted to construct a road in the 1960s and 1970s, they constructed a road
without taking complaints of citizens seriously. People were not sufficiently aware of their
rights and the possibility of influencing the decision-making process through protests, etc.
However, during the 1970s, the a priori authority of public institutions crumbled away.
Citizens demanded public institutions to justify their actions. According to these three
respondents, instruments such as the CBA and the EIA do not necessarily lead to different
3 In Dutch practice, a BCR of 0.5 implies that negative societal effects (for instance, construction costs and
noise pollution) are two times larger than the positive societal effects.
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decisions, but lead to more satisfaction for the citizens, since it appears that the govern-
ment has looked very carefully at how the project will affect them and they have taken this
into consideration. Hence, CBA may increase the credibility and acceptability of political
decisions among the population.
Solutions for enhancing the use of CBA when forming an opinion
In the interviews, politicians were asked to come up with solutions to enhance the extent to
which they use CBA in forming judgments. Since, MPs predominantly mentioned solu-
tions for rectifying the two most important barriers for their use of CBA—these being ‘late
publication of CBA reports’ and ‘lack of trust in CBA’s impartiality’—these solutions will
be discussed at length in this section. No solutions were discussed for barrier 2: ‘Politicians
prefer forming their opinion based on conversations rather than on reading reports’ and
barrier 7: ‘Politicians care less about the social profitability of a project when there is
enough money’ because politicians did not seem to regard these as barriers that should or
even could be rectified at all. Politicians stated that barrier 1: ‘the process of forming an
opinion is trivial’ is higher when CBAs are carried out in the final stage of the decision-
making process, since it is possible that politicians have already made up their minds about
the desirability of the project. When CBAs are carried out in the conceptual phase of the
decision-making process, it is more likely that actors will not yet have a definitive
viewpoint regarding the project and in this case CBA can have more effect.
Safeguard the early publication of CBA reports
The solution for the late publication of CBAs that the respondents mentioned seems to be
relatively straightforward at first glance: ‘just publish the CBA one or two months before
the debate’. However, executives and civil servants mention four reasons why it is difficult
to avoid a late publication. Firstly, a controversy around the (interpretation of the) CBA
can delay its publication. Generally, a CBA is only published when civil servants and/or
executives have reached a consensus about the CBA’s quality or the way CBA results
should be interpreted. A second cause for a delayed publication is that the Cabinet has not
decided upon the project yet. As explained, some projects are decided upon at Cabinet
level and when it is still uncertain whether the Cabinet will approve or reject the project,
the CBA—which will be used in the underpinning of the Cabinet’s decision—will not be
published. According to one civil servant a CBA which is published before the Cabinet has
reached consensus can be an unguided missile, since MPs and journalists can ask the
minister for a response on the CBA, but it is difficult for the minister to give an answer
when there is not yet a consensus in the Cabinet. This civil servant states that: ‘if you like a
controlled decision-making process, you never send a CBA before a Cabinet decision. If
you like an uncontrolled decision-making process, you send the CBA to Parliament before
the Cabinet has reached a consensus’. Thirdly, executives can have an interest in the late
publication of CBA reports when the results do not (sufficiently) support their decision on
a project. If executives want to approve a project and the CBA is negative, a late publi-
cation safeguards that MPs, stakeholders who oppose the project and journalists do not
have the time to read the report carefully (and criticize it), which is to the executives’
advantage. A civil servant notes that it was almost a habit of one of the executives she
served to delay the publication of reports with unwelcome results. A fourth cause is time
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pressure in the process of constructing the CBA. CBA is an end-of-pipe analysis, which
implies that its completion can be delayed when an input study (e.g. cost estimations and
estimations of transport effects) suffers from a delay.
Enhance the trust in CBA’s impartiality
Politicians mention several solutions for enhancing their trust in CBA’s impartiality.
Firstly, early publication of CBAs safeguards that politicians (or their confidants) can
verify a CBA’s impartiality. One interviewed MP argues that the debate on the National
Program for Infrastructure Projects should be delayed when the CBA is not published
one month in advance. According to this MP, making this a requirement by law is the only
means of eliminating any strategic late publication of CBAs from the system. Another
group of politicians advocates enhancing the power and capacity of the Research Bureau
for Government Spending—which is a small research agency of the Parliament (12
employees)—so they can verify the impartiality and quality of research reports and also
carry out their own analyses. However, other politicians contest this solution, since they
fear that magnifying the power and capacity of this agency will lead to an arms race with
the ministry which they regard as undesirable. These politicians prefer an early publication
which would give their confidants and civil society the chance to verify the report. One
respondent advocates a middle position which is giving the Research Bureau for
Government Spending the same mandate as the US Congressional Budget Office, enabling
the Bureau to return research reports to the ministries when the timing, quality and
impartiality of the report is questionable. Other politicians think that an institution which
has no direct interest in CBA results should be the commissioner of CBAs. This resembles
the Chilean practice where the institution that evaluates projects is a separate entity from
the institutions promoting projects (Gomez-Lobo 2012). Several respondents state that
their trust in CBA’s impartiality improves when the transparency of CBA reports is
enhanced, implying that analysts make it very clear which subjective/normative choices4
they have made in the CBA and to which extent these choices influence the results. This
solution aims to iron out both barrier 3 (low trust in impartiality) and barrier 4 (contest
normative premises). Moreover, one politician states that the certification of CBA analysts
would enhance her trust in CBAs. Finally, one respondent notes that her trust in CBA’s
impartiality increases when, whilst reading the report, she feels that there was space for the
analysts to bring in own observations, new alternatives and reflections on the problem
definition etc.
It should be noted that many politicians emphasized that they did not believe that the
implementation of their solutions would lead to CBAs being fully impartial. These
politicians do not think that it is possible to rule out all tactical behavior, but they do
believe that the current state of affairs can be improved.
4 For instance, the normative choice made in CBA that an equally large weight is attached to everybody’s
utility changes. An example of a subjective choice was already discussed by a respondent in ‘‘Politicians’
use of CBA when forming their opinion’’ section (p. 8). A first model run produced extremely low values
and a second model run produced extremely high values. The outcomes of the model runs were discussed
and some decisions were taken. According to the respondent these decisions were affected by the travel
experiences of the individuals: ‘‘an analyst who travels by train makes a different choice than a car driver
who detests public transport’’.
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General reflections on the solutions’ feasibility
In the interviews, executives and civil servants were asked how they assessed the feasi-
bility of the solutions discussed in ‘‘Safeguard the early publication of CBA reports’’ and
‘‘Enhance the trust in CBA’s impartiality’’ section, since without their support it is difficult
to remove the barriers. However, the majority of the executives and civil servants did not
see it as their duty to remove the barriers. The ultimate goal seemed to be sending a letter
to Parliament with properly underpinned decisions about infrastructure projects before the
debate about the National Program for Infrastructure Projects starts. Executives and civil
servants did not seem to feel that they had a responsibility to inform MPs about the
outcomes of research projects as early as possible in order to optimize the possibility that
they would use this information when making their judgments about the desirability of a
project. They regard Parliament as being primarily the institution which should control the
(underpinning of the) executives’ decisions.5 Executives and civil servants acknowledge
that in contemporary politics MPs can act as co-decision makers,6 but they believe that it’s
MPs’ own responsibility to search for knowledge when they wish to form their opinion.
Moreover, some executives and civil servants argued that it is Parliament’s own fault if
they decide to proceed with the debate when they feel that there was not enough time to
read, process and verify all relevant information referring to the right of the Parliament to
delay a debate. Why do MPs not use this right and delay the debate? Interviewed MPs
clarify that a debate can only be delayed when a majority in Parliament supports a delay
and the MPs from the incumbent parties generally will avoid a delay if they—or the
executives—prefer to make decisions during the debate.
An interesting result from this study is that, on the one hand, MPs endorse that the late
publication of a CBA significantly affects the extent to which the CBA results can be used
in forming an opinion but, on the other hand, they make statements which contradict that
late publication is a problem which should be solved. Several executives and civil servants
qualified the strategic timing of the publication of research reports as ‘part of the game’
and ‘clever tactics’. It is even more interesting that some MPs who complain about the
strategic timing of the publication of research reports at the same time argue that this is
something MPs should accept and that people who ‘cannot deal with it’ should look for a
different job. Moreover, both executives and MPs defend the legitimacy of the practice that
executives deliberately delay publication by arguing that MPs also try to surprise the
executives with publishing reports very close to a debate. One executive claims that MPs
who complain about the delayed publication are hypocrites, since they would do the same
thing in their role as executive.
Discussion
One key observation about this study is that politicians will not necessarily use CBA when
forming their opinion as there are various barriers for such use. The majority of the
politicians was not able to mention a case in which a CBA changed their viewpoint about a
project’s desirability from positive to negative or vice versa. This result does not
5 Note that it is questionable whether Parliament can fulfil its controlling function when a CBA report is
sent to Parliament one working day before the debate.
6 In Dutch practice, party leaders of the incumbent parties and executives are in close contact. Generally
they have a meeting every Thursday.
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necessarily imply that CBA has a marginal influence on the Dutch planning and decision-
making process for transport projects, since there is evidence in the literature that civil
servants use CBAs to optimize infrastructure projects in the early phases of the planning
process (e.g. Eliasson and Lundberg 2012; Mouter et al. 2013b).
It is likely that the barriers identified in this study help to explain results of previous
studies (e.g. Eliasson and Lundberg 2012; Nyborg 1998; Sager and Ravlum 2005), which
found no clear evidence that CBA results affect politicians’ opinions, but did find evidence
for opportunistic and symbolic use of CBA. Hence, the identification of the seven barriers
is probably the most important contribution of this study to the existing literature.7 It goes
without saying that it is interesting to scrutinize the generalizability of this result to other
countries applying CBA in further research. Are the identified barriers a ‘Dutch disease’ or
are these barriers also experienced in other practices? And, if the barriers are not expe-
rienced in other practices, how did these practices rectify the barriers? Moreover, further
research may investigate the merits of the proposed solutions by politicians for enhancing
their trust in the CBA’s impartiality and compare these solutions with other solutions
proposed in the literature (e.g. van Wee 2015 proposes to develop a code of conduct for
CBA clients to enhance the trust in CBAs).
A practical recommendation resulting from this study for Dutch and international
practitioners and scholars who aspire enhancing the extent to which politicians use CBA
when forming their opinion—and face similar barriers as identified in this study—is
finding solutions for improving the institutional design of CBA to safeguard the early
publication of CBA and the trust in CBA’s impartiality instead of allocating resources to
research areas which are widely studied at present (e.g. Value of Time, Value of Statistical
Life, improvement of transport models). None of the politicians argued that they would
assign more value to CBA if, for example, the Value of Time was calculated in a more
sophisticated way.
An important lesson for international practitioners and scholars which can be derived
from this study is that many Dutch MPs believe that CBAs are manipulated or implicitly
influenced despite the fact that CBAs are reviewed with second opinions. The primary
function of the second opinions seems to be safeguarding executives’ trust in the quality
and impartiality of CBA. When practitioners aspire to improve the perceived impartiality
of CBAs among MPs, it is recommended to ensure an early publication of CBAs which
enables confidants of MP’s to verify the CBA. MP’s argue that there is enough time for
verification when CBAs are published 1 month before the debate on the National Program
for Infrastructure Projects. However, it is recommended that the CBA is disclosed to MPs
even earlier, as several MPs argue that, in general, changing a political standpoint is a
gradual process. Further research may investigate how much time the politicians need on
average to fully digest results of a CBA.
Politicians argued that CBA analysts should make it much clearer which subjective/
normative choices were made in the CBA to iron out the barrier: ‘politicians disagree with
the normative choices made in CBA’.8 These statements imply that politicians are aware of
the fact that CBA is not a neutral, objective or value-free instrument which is well-
established in academic literature (e.g. Bromley 1990; Driesen 2006; Nyborg 2014).
Moreover, it can be argued that for these politicians it is not even desirable to use a CBA,
7 Note that Nyborg (1998) and Sager and Ravlum (2005) also touched upon the following barriers: ‘when
there is plenty of money politicians care less about a project’s social profitability’, ‘politicians disagree with
the normative choice made in CBA’ and ‘politicians think that CBA’s explanatory power is limited.’
8 As discussed politicians state that a side benefit of this solution is that it enhances their trust in CBA.
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since it brings them further away from (dis)approving projects which (don’t) coincide with
their worldview. From a democratic perspective it can be argued that it is desirable to
provide politicians disagreeing with CBA’s normative premises with alternative infor-
mation to give politicians with diverging ethical views the same opportunity to make a
well-founded judgment about the desirability of policy options. Partly, it is possible to
democratize CBA through what can be called ‘moral sensitivity analyses’. More specifi-
cally, when the heterogeneity in politicians’ attitudes towards normative premises in CBA-
methodology is established9 one can identify the extent to which diverging sets of nor-
mative preferences lead to different CBA scores. Although moral sensitivity analyses
would definitely enhance the usefulness of CBA in a democracy, it is still possible that
politicians assign value to other ethical considerations which are excluded in a CBA (see
van Wee 2012 for an overview).
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